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Outsourced Decentralized Multi-authority Attribute
Based Signature and Its Application in IoT
Jiameng Sun, Ye Su, Jing Qin, Jiankun Hu , Senior Member, IEEE, and Jixin Ma.
Abstract—IoT (Internet of things) devices often collect data and
store the data in the cloud for sharing and further processing;
This collection, sharing, and processing will inevitably encounter
secure access and authentication issues. Attribute based signature
(ABS), which utilizes the signer’s attributes to generate private
keys, plays a competent role in data authentication and identity
privacy preservation. In ABS, there are multiple authorities that
issue different private keys for signers based on their various
attributes, and a central authority is usually established to
manage all these attribute authorities. However, one security
concern is that if the central authority is compromised, the whole
system will be broken. In this paper, we present an outsourced
decentralized multi-authority attribute based signature (ODMA-
ABS) scheme. The proposed ODMA-ABS achieves attribute pri-
vacy and stronger authority-corruption resistance than existing
multi-authority attribute based signature schemes can achieve.
In addition, the overhead to generate a signature is further
reduced by outsourcing expensive computation to a signing cloud
server. We present extensive security analysis and experimental
simulation of the proposed scheme. We also propose an access
control scheme that is based on ODMA-ABS.
Index Terms—attribute based signature, anonymous authenti-
cation, outsourcing computation, access control.
I. INTRODUCTION
ATTRIBUTE based signature (ABS) is a primitive thatderives from identity based signature [1]. ABS enables a
signer to endorse a piece of message using a set of attributes
instead of his/her unique identity, promoting the harmony be-
tween message endorsement and identity privacy preservation.
In an ABS, the user uses his attribute set to query the attribute
authority for private keys corresponding to certain attributes.
Since an individual may have various kinds of attributes, e.g.
gender, profession, address, etc., there are usually multiple
attribute authorities that handle requests of different kinds
of attributes. This multi-authority setting helps amortize the
computational overhead in a single authority case and more
importantly, enhances the security since one or some of the
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authorities’ compromising or corruption may not affect the
others.
However, a multi-authority setting leads to difficulty re-
garding how to generate a common secret for signature’s
generation given that authorities may not trust or communicate
with each other. A feasible means is to establish a central
authority that holds the common secret and allocates different
parts of this secret to each attribute authority to help with
private keys’ generation. However this means returns us to
the disadvantages in a single authority scenario because once
the central authority is compromised, the whole system will no
longer be secure. Therefore, a key point in a multi-authority
attribute based signature is decentralization. In this paper, we
take use of the idea that is introduced in decentralized multi-
authority attribute based encryption schemes [2]. The core idea
is to simulate the functionality of a central authority through
interactions among different attribute authorities.
Efficiency is another key point for the practical applications
of the ABS. Actually, the multi-authority setting does not re-
duce overhead for the signer, instead, it may even increase the
overhead in certain ways because the signer must interact with
multiple authorities to obtain the secret keys associated with
his/her whole attributes. This situation may even worsen when
the signer wants to perform the message endorsing action
on portable devices that lack sufficient computational power,
such as the IoT devices. Fortunately, this predicament can be
effectively improved if we notice that generating a signature
is essentially using private keys to execute a computation
on the message because now, with the assistance of Cloud
computing, the signer can choose to outsource a heavy portion
of the computation that must be done in the signing phase to
a cloud server to reduce his/her local cost. In this paradigm,
since the cloud server is commercial and may not be fully
trusted, the challenge is to assure the correctness of a server’s
output as well as the security of the signature protocol (e.g.
unforgeability). Specifically, given an attribute based signature
protocol, the signer cannot simply send all of his/her private
keys to the cloud server to generate the signature. This issue
is obvious because, if so, the server will be able to forge
the signer’s signature on any other messages thereafter. To
maintain security, one feasible means is to encode the private
keys using fully homomorphic encryption; however, this will
inherently bring huge computation overhead. In this paper, we
divide the private keys in two parts and let the signer outsource
the “big” part of them while maintaining the “small” part as a
secret. The cloud server uses the “big” part of the private keys
to generate a partial signature and return it to the signer. The
signer can combine the other part that is generated from the
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“small” private key part with the partial signature to obtain
the final signature. Note that, without the part of the signature
that is generated from the “small” private key part, the partial
signature is not a valid signature. In addition, it is necessary
that the partial signature is able to be verified by the signer
to maintain correctness. Fortunately, this verification can be
derived from the verification of the original ABS protocol; this
enables us to construct the secure and efficient ABS protocol.
A. Applications
As an important cryptographic primitive to maintain
anonymity, (multi-authority) attribute based signature has var-
ious applications in the IoT scenario. Here, we introduce two
common applications, anonymous data certification and access
control. There are also other applications of ABS, such as
fulfilling security requirement in attribute based messaging
system [3], etc..
1) Anonymous data certification: In the IoT paradigm,
smart devices that are equipped with sensors are connected to
the cloud. The sensors continuously collect data information
from the surroundings and then upload these data to the cloud
for sharing or further processing. For example, in the vehicular
ad hoc networks (VANETs), sensors on the vehicle collect the
surrounding road condition of their location and can share
it with others in the network. In the smart home system,
the sensors embedded in the house collect information of
the user’s house, such as temperature and light intensity, and
upload the data to the cloud, after which evaluations on the
data are performed to decide the optimal deployment for this
house. Usually, the data that is collected by the sensors should
be certificated before uploading to convince the cloud that the
data are from devices that belong to a legitimate user. To do so,
it is feasible to utilize the user’s identity to generate a signature
for the data, that is, applying an identity based signature
scheme on the data. However, this means will inherently
expose the user’s identity. Notice that the exposure of the
identity may lead to huge security concerns. For example,
in a VANET, the road information that is uploaded by the
user implicitly implies the location of the user him/herself,
and an adversary can easily obtain it then infer where the
user is when this uploaded information is certified by his/her
certain identity. Additionally, in the smart home system, if
the uploaded information is linked to a certain identity, an
adversary can observe and obtain useful information about the
user’s house such as when it is empty. The above concerns
are caused because the linkage between data and an identity
exists. However, it is currently sufficient to certify that the
data originates from a legitimate user if we can prove that
the data owner has some required characters (or attributes).
Attribute based signature is able to realize this functionality
and therefore preserves the identity privacy.
2) Access control: Another application of attribute based
signature is to provide an access control policy for IoT devices.
Traditional access control schemes usually grant access by
establishing a relationship between devices and individuals.
However, with the increase of the amount and variety of
IoT devices, it is inconvenient to define the identities that
can access certain devices, especially when the device is not
personal. In fact, the access to such devices is essentially
defined by a number of characters (attributes) instead of
specific identities. furthermore, if the user accesses a public
device by verifying his/her identity, certain private information
may be leaked by monitoring the device. For example his/her
location information may be learned by tracking the location
of the device. Since multi-authority attribute based signature
implicitly provides a means to prove the legitimacy of an
anonymous identity, it can be utilized to construct a flexible
and privacy preserving access control scheme that is based on
attributes.
B. Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose a novel model called out-
sourced decentralized multi-authority attribute based signature
(ODMA-ABS). This model captures both the security require-
ments of an ABS protocol and the efficiency requirement of
an outsourcing computation protocol. We present the specific
construction of an ODMA-ABS protocol and provide the
corresponding analysis of each property, such as correctness,
unforgeability, attribute privacy, efficiency, outsourcing secu-
rity and privacy. We also conduct an experimental simulation
to show the performance of ODMA-ABS. In addition, we
propose an attribute based access control scheme, ABAC, as a
specific application of ODMA-ABS and discuss the key update
of ABAC.
This paper is an extension of its corresponding conference
version [6]. In the revised version, the adversarial model
of ODMA-ABS is enhanced from semi-honest to malicious.
We propose a novel ODMA-ABS that is secure under this
new model, analyze the outsourcing security and privacy, and
conduct an experimental simulation to show practical perfor-
mance. The proposed novel ABAC achieves nontransferability
and is efficient for the user by introducing an aiding server.
In addition, some of the content is extended. For example, we
specifically explain the ideas behind our construction and the
unforgeability proof. We formalize the definition of attribute
privacy and provide rigorous proof instead of simply intuition,
and more figures and tables are added for better understanding.
All of the above are not shown in the conference version.
C. Related Works
1) Attribute based signature: There are a number of pro-
tocols that maintain anonymous authentication, such as group
signature [4] and ring signature [5]. However, these protocols
all suffer from certain disadvantages. Group signature, which
requires a “manager” to address the identities of the group,
may suffer from identity exposure when the “manager” is
compromised. Ring signature, which requires the signer to
collect all the public keys of other members in the ring, may
not be convenient in many practical scenarios. Considering
thiss situation, attribute based signature may play a much
better role in practice. ABS was first defined and constructed
in 2008 by Maji et al. [3]. The researchers presented a
scheme supporting the predicate described by a monotone span
program. Later, a (k, n)-threshold predicate construction was
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proposed by Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini [7]. In 2010, Li
et al. [8] proposed another construction that achieves better
efficiency than that in [7].Futhermore, the researchers also
proposed a construction for the multi-authority scenario. There
are other works that focus on MA-ABS [9], [10], [11]. In 2013,
Okamoto and Takashima [12] proposed the first decentralized
multi-authority attribute-based signature (DMA-ABS) scheme
in the random oracle model, which removes the trusted central
authority of the MA-ABS scheme. Although the researchers’
scheme was as efficient as the former MA-ABS, the sizes of
the private keys and signature remain very large.
2) Outsourcing computation: Outsourcing computation
was first proposed by Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [13]
and formally defined by Gennaro et al. [14]. Gennaro et al.
proposed a means to use Gentry’s [15] fully homomorphic en-
cryption (FHE) together with Yao’s [16] 2-party computation
to securely outsource any circuit evaluation. Since operating
FHE is very expensive, the scheme is not very practical. Later
other works [17], [18], [19] were proposed to improve the
performance in using FHE, but the performance is still not
ideal.
To avoid using FHE, certain works have been done to
seek other means to securely outsource specific kinds of
computation. Regarding attribute based cryptography, Green
et al. [20] proposed a scheme to outsource the decryption
phase of attribute based encryption (ABE) scheme, and Zhou
et al. [21] proposed a scheme to outsource the encryption and
decryption of ABE. Recently, Cai et al. [22] proposed an Elec-
tronic health record system, which supports offline encryption
and outsourced decryption in mobile cloud computing. In
2014, Chen et al. [23] proposed an outsourced attribute based
signature (OABS) scheme. The researchers utilize the blinding
technique to make attribute private keys piecewise; thus, it
will preserve attribute privacy in the outsourcing paradigm.
However the scheme is constructed in a single authority model.
In 2017, Ren et al. [24] proposed another OABS scheme
that achieves correctness verification of the outsourced signing
operation; however, it remains a single authority proposal. In
Table I, we present a comparison in certain properties among
different ABS schemes, including the decentralized multi-
authority ABS[12], the outsourced ABS [23], the outsourced
ABS with verification of outsourcing operation [24] and our
ODMA-ABS.
D. Paper Organization
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows.
Necessary preliminaries are provided for the proposed schemes
in section II. The model of decentralized multi-authority
attribute based signature (DMA-ABS) is defined in section
III. The proposed outsourced decentralized multi-authority
attribute based signature scheme is presented and analyzed
in section IV. An attribute based access control scheme is
proposed and discussed in section V. Section VI concludes
the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first introduce the notations used in
this paper. Then we provide the definitions of pseudorandom
function (PRF), Bilinear Map, threshold predicate for multi set
and Lagrange coefficient. We also provide the computational
assumptions that our protocol are based on, the co-CDH
assumption and XDH assumption.
A. Notations
The main notations that are used in this paper are shown
and explained in Table II.
TABLE II
NOTATIONS IN THIS PAPER
Notations Description
Ak,u
attribute subset that belongs to user u and is
managed by attribute authority k
Υn,C∗ (n,C∗)-threshold predicate
G∈RG randomly select an element G in group G
eˆ(g1, g2) bilinear operation of group element g1 and g2
H Hash function
σ signature
B. Pseudorandom Function
Our construction utilizes the pseudorandom function (PRF)
[25]. Informally speaking, a PRF takes as input a random
value in the domain and outputs a value that is computational
indistinguishable from a truly random value in the range.
We give the specific definition of the pseudorandom function
family below.
Definition 1 (Pseudorandom function family). Let F =
{fs|s ∈ {0, 1}λ}λ∈N. Then F is called a family of
(X(λ), Y (λ)) pseudorandom function if the following holds,
• ∀λ ∈ N,∀s ∈ {0, 1}λ, fs : {0, 1}X(λ) → {0, 1}Y (λ);
• ∀λ ∈ N,∀s ∈ {0, 1}λ, fs can be computed in polynomial
time;
• Pseudorandomness: for any probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm A, there holds
|Pr[Afs(1λ) = 1|s U←− {0, 1}λ]−
Pr[Ag(1λ) = 1|g U←− R(X(λ), Y (λ))]| ≤ negl(λ),
where R(X(λ), Y (λ)) is the set of all possible functions
g : {0, 1}X(λ) → {0, 1}Y (λ).
TABLE I
COMPARISON AMONG DIFFERENT ATTRIBUTE BASED SIGNATURE SCHEMES
DMA-ABS[12] OABS[23] OABS-V[24] ODMA-ABS
Authority(ies) involved multiple(N ) single single multiple(N )
Decentralization yes ⊥ ⊥ yes
Corrupted authority(ies) tolerance weak no no strong(N − 1)
Outsourcing verifiability ⊥ no yes yes
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C. Bilinear Map
Our construction also utilizes the bilinear map. The bilinear
map is a powerful tool in non-interactive authentication and
has been widely applied in both signature and outsourcing
computation schemes [26], [27].
Definition 2 (Bilinear map). Let G1,G2 and GT be finite
cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p, and g1, g2 be
generators of G1 and G2 respectively. A map eˆ : G1 ×G2 →
GT is called a bilinear map if it satisfies the following
properties:
• Bilinearity: it holds that
eˆ(ga1 , g
b
2) = eˆ(g1, g2)
ab (1)
for all a, b ∈ Zp.
• Non-degeneracy: There exist G1 ∈ G1, G2 ∈ G2 such
that eˆ(G1, G2) 6= 1.
• Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to
compute eˆ(G1, G2) for any G1 ∈ G1, G2 ∈ G2.
We say that the bilinear group is symmetric if there exists
an efficiently computable isomorphism φ from G1 to G2 and
an efficiently computable isomorphism φ′ from G2 to G1.
Similarly, we say that the bilinear group is asymmetric if such
φ′ does not exist. (φ from G1 to G2 may or may not exists.)
Our construction is based on asymmetric group where such φ
exists.
D. Threshold Predicate
Our construction applies to threshold predicate scenario. We
modify the definition of threshold presicate to make it suitable
for multi-set scenario.
Definition 3 (Threshold predicate). Let C∗ =
⋃
k∈{1,··· ,N} C
∗
k
be a union of attribute sets, with each C∗k of size mk. And
let n =
∑
k∈{1,··· ,N} nk be an integer, where each nk is
an integer in [0,mk]. A threshold predicate for multi-set is
a monotone boolean function that is defined as follows.
Υn,C∗(A) =
{
1, |A ∩ C∗k | ≥ nk, for k ∈ {1, · · · , N}
0, otherwise
We say that an attribute set A satisfies a predicate Υ if
Υ(A) = 1.
E. Lagrange Coefficient
Our construction utilizes the Lagrange interpolation.
Definition 4 (Lagrange coefficient). Let p(·) be a d−1 degree
polynomial, and p(1), · · · , p(d) be the corresponding values
in d points. Write S = {1, · · · , d}. We define the Lagrange
coefficient in the computation p(x) as
∆i,S(x) =
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
x− j
i− j
Then the polynomial p(x) can be represented as
p(x) =
d∑
i=1
p(i)∆i,S(x) (2)
Fig. 1. System Architecture: “Auth1, Auth2, Auth3” refer to different attribute
authorities, “User” refers to the signer who would like to generate the signature, “SCS”
refers to the signing cloud server that generates partial signature for the user. The
signature is verified by a verifier, who is not indicated in the figure.
F. Computational Assumption
Our construction is based on standard assumptions, the co-
CDH assumption and the XDH assumption.
Definition 5 (co-CDH assumption). Let GB be a bilinear
group generator that takes as input a parameter λ and outputs
a description of a bilinear group (p, g1, g2,G1,G2,GT , eˆ),
where p is the order, g1, g2 the generators of G1,G2 respec-
tively, and eˆ the bilinear map from G1 × G2 to GT . We say
that the co-CDH assumption (t, ) holds if for any probabilistic
polynomial t-time algorithm A there holds
|Pr[A(p, g1, g2, ga1 , gb2) = gab2 ]| ≤ ,
where a, b ∈R Zp.
Definition 6 (XDH assumption). Let (p, g1, g2,G1,G2,GT , eˆ,
φ) be an asymmetric bilinear tuple where φ is a one way map
from G1 to G2. We say that the XDH assumption (t, ) holds
in G2 if for any probabilistic polynomial t-time algorithm A
there holds
|Pr[A(p, eˆ, φ, g1, g2, ga2 , gb2, gab2 ) = 1]−
Pr[A(p, eˆ, φ, g1, g2, ga2 , gb2, gc2) = 1| ≤ ,
where a, b, c ∈R Zp.
Notice that the XDH assumption does not hold in symmetric
bilinear groups. This is obvious since that one can map ga2
onto the element in G1 and uses bilinear map eˆ to distinguish
the XDH tuple. The same thing also holds for group G1 in
asymmetric setting since φ exists.
III. MODELING ODMA-ABS
In this section, we present some relative definitions of the
ODMA-ABS. Fig.1 shows the system architecture of ODMA-
ABS. We define each algorithm that is corresponding to each
phase in Fig.1.
A. Definitions
Definition 7 (Outsourced decentralized multi-authority at-
tribute based signature). An outsourced decentralized multi-
authority attribute based signature protocol pi is defined via
the following five algorithms.
(I) (PP,MSK) ← Setup(λ,N): The randomized system
setup algorithm takes as input a secure parameter λ, the
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number of attribute authorities N , and outputs the public
parameter PP and the master secret key MSK for each
attribute authority. This is done by interactions among
the multiple authorities.
(II) (OK,SK) ← AKeyGen(PP,MSK,Au): The random-
ized key generation algorithm takes as input the public
parameter PP , the master secret key MSK, the attribute
set Au of user u and outputs the outsourcing key OK
and the private key SK. Here Au =
⋃
k∈{1,··· ,N}Ak,u,
where Ak,u represents the attribute subset that is certified
by the kth attribute authority. This procedure is done
independently by interaction between the user and each
attribute authority.
(III) (σpart,W ) ← Signout(OK,Au,Υn,C∗): The randomized
outsourced signing algorithm takes as input the out-
sourcing key OK of all attribute authorities, the us-
er’s attribute set Au, a predicate Υnk,C∗k where C
∗ =⋃
k∈{1,··· ,N} C
∗
k and n =
∑
k∈{1,··· ,N} nk. It outputs the
partial signature σpart and the corresponding witness W .
This algorithm is done by the signing cloud server (SCS).
(IV) (σ,⊥) ← Sign(SK,m, σpart,W,Υn,C∗): The random-
ized signing algorithm takes as input the private key
SK, the message to-be-signed m, the partial signature
σpart, the witness W , the predicate Υn,C∗ and outputs
the formal signature σ if the partial signature is verified
and accepted, or a symbol ⊥ if the partial signature is
rejected. This is done by the user.
(V) b← Verify(PP, σ,m,Υn,C∗): The deterministic verifica-
tion algorithm takes as input the public parameter PP ,
the signature σ with signed message m and predicate
Υn,C∗ and outputs 1 if it the signature is valid and 0
otherwise. This is done by the verifier.
Definition 8 (Correctness). An ODMA-ABS protocol is cor-
rect if for all (PP,MSK) R←− Setup(λ,N), all attribute
sets {Ak}, all (OK,SK) R←− AKeyGen(PP,MSK,Au), all
predicate Υn,C∗ , all σpart
R←− Signout(OK,Au,Υn,C∗), all
messages m, and all σ R←− Sign(SK,m, σpart,Υn,C∗), the
verification algorithm outputs 1 with probability 1 −  where
 is negligible.
An ODMA-ABS protocol is required to satisfy the ex-
istential unforgeability property. Consider the unforgeability
experiment ExpeufF,ODMA-ABS between a challenger C and an
adversary F in a selective predicate model.
• Initial C receives a corrupted authorities set Kc ⊆
{1, · · · , N} and the challenge predicate Υn,C∗ , where
C∗ =
⋃
k/∈Kc C
∗
k and n =
∑
k/∈Kc nk.
• Setup C runs the Setup(λ,N) algorithm. It sends PP to
F and keeps MSK.
• Query F is allowed to perform a series of the following
queries.
– Private key query: F can query C for SK with an
identity u.
– Outsourcing key query: F can query C for OK with
attribute union set A =
⋃
k/∈Kc Ak.
– Signing query: F can query C for signature with
message m and predicate Υ.
• Forgery F outputs a tuple (m∗, σ∗,Υn,C∗).
We say that F wins if i) (m∗, σ∗,Υn,C∗) passes the
verification algorithm; ii) Υn,C∗(A) 6= 1 for any A that
has been submitted to the Outsourcing key query oracle; iii)
(m∗,Υn,C∗) has not been submitted to the Signing query
oracle.
Definition 9 (Unforgeability). An ODMA-ABS scheme is
(t, , n, qP , qO, qS)-unforgeable if no probabilistic polynomial
t time adversary F can win the unforgeability experiment over
 when at most n attribute authorities are corrupted, with at
most qP , qO, and qS times of private key query, outsourcing
key query and signing query respectively.
An ODMA-ABS protocol is supposed to achieve attribute
privacy for the signer. Informally speaking, attribute privacy
requires that the signature reveals nothing about user’s identity
or attribute set except for what is revealed explicitly. This holds
even for the situation that the adversary gets access to the
user’s attribute private keys. Former definition is based on the
following experiment ExpaprF,ODMA-ABS between a challenger C
and an adversary F .
• Setup C runs the Setup(λ,N) algorithm. It sends
(PP,MSK) to F .
• Query F is provided with access to private key oracle,
outsourcing key oracle and signing oracle as that in
ExpeufF,ODMA-ABS.
• Challenge F outputs a tuple (Au0, Au1,Υn,C∗ ,m),
where Υn,C∗(Aui) = 1 for (i = 0, 1). F then sends
the tuple to C. C picks a random bit b ∈ {1, 2} and runs
AKeyGen algorithm with input (PP,MSK,Aub). Con-
sequently, C gets OKb and SKb. It then runs algorithms
Signout and Sign with input (OKb, Aub,Υn,C∗) and
(SK,m, σpart,Υn,C∗) respectively to get a challenging
signature σ∗, which is then sent back to F .
• Guess Upon receiving σ∗, F outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}
and wins the game if b′ = b.
Definition 10 (Attribute privacy). An ODMA-ABS protocol
achieves attribute private for the signer if no probabilistic
polynomial time adversary F can win the above game with an
advantage probability no less than 12 +negl(λ), where negl()
is a negligible function.
As an outsourcing computation protocol, the ODMA-ABS
is also required to satisfy the efficiency property.
Definition 11 (Efficiency). An ODMA-ABS scheme is efficient
if the total computation cost on the signer side is less than the
cost to generate the signature all by the user.
IV. THE PROPOSED ODMA-ABS PROTOCOL
A. Anonymous Key Issue Protocol
Our construction takes use of an anonymous key issue (AKI)
protocol proposed in [28]. We would like to give a brief
introduction first.
The AKI is an interactive protocol executed between a user
and an attribute authority. In the AKI, a user U and an attribute
authority A have access to some commonly known values, and
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keep some secret values. They jointly compute a value through
the following steps.
• Step 1: Set up the public parameters including a group
G of order p, two group elements g, h ∈ G and a hash
function that maps a string to an element in Zp.
• Step 2: A general 2-party computation protocol is execut-
ed on input (u, a1) from U and β from A, where u is the
hash value of the U ’s identity GID, and (a1, β) ∈R G.
Such 2-party computation can be realized via the protocol
in [29]. As a result, A obtains x := (β + u)a1 mod p.
• Step 3: A computes X1 := gτ/x, X2 := hατ and sends
X1, X2 to U , where α, τ ∈R Zp.
• Step 4: On receiving X1, X2, U picks a2 ∈R Zp and
computes Y := (Xa11 X2)
a2 . Then Y is sent to A.
• Step 5: On receiving Y , A picks a γ ∈R Zp and computes
Z := Y γ/τ . Then Z is sent to U .
• Step 6: finally, on receiving Z, U computes Z1/a2 =
(hαg1/(β+u))γ .
The correctness of the above protocol is easy to verify by
the following equation.
Z1/a2 = Y γ/(τ/a2) = (X
a1γ/τ
1 X
γ/τ
2 )
= (ga1γ/xhαγ) = (hαg1/(β+u))γ
(3)
The above protocol is secure under DDH assumption as-
suming that the underlying 2-party computation is secure. The
proof can be found in [28].
Now we are about to utilize the AKI protocol to construct
the signature protocol.
B. ODMA-ABS Construction
The construction is based on the signature scheme of Li
et at.’s [8]. In [8], a multi-authority ABS is proposed with
a central authority established to allocate differen parts of a
shared secret to each authority. By utilizing the AKI protocol
above, the function of the central authority can be simulated by
interactions among the multiple authorities. However, notice
that the scheme in [8] is based on the symmetric bilinear group
where XDH assumption does not hold and thus the AKI can
not be used directly. So we should first change the underlying
bilinear group to an asymmetric one and reconstruct a cor-
responding multi-authority attribute based signature protocol.
After that we are able to use the AKI protocol to remove the
central authority. In addition, it is observed that the resulting
attribute signing keys for the user cannot reconstruct a secret
without the master secret key, hence they can be outsourced to
a signing cloud server (SCS) to generate a partial signature and
the user can then combine this partial signature with the other
part that is generated from the master secret key to fulfill the
formal signature, which will greatly reduce the computational
overhead of the user. However, since the SCS is commercial
and cannot be fully trusted, it is necessary for the user to
check whether the SCS has performed the partial signature
computation correctly, and this check is better to operate on
the spot. We address this problem by requiring the SCS to
generate an auxiliary witness for the user to verify the validity
of the partial signature. The verification is passed only when
the partial signature is correctly generated. Additionally, to
reduce the computational overhead of the user, we let the SCS
do most of the computations required in the verification and
output the corresponding results as the witness.
We will present the details of each algorithm. Let the
Lagrange coefficients be as that in definition 4. Then the
proposed ODMA-ABS scheme is shown by the following five
algorithms as follows.
• Setup(λ,N): On input the security parameter λ, and a
common reference string (CRS), the N attribute author-
ities generate an admissible asymmetric bilinear group
denoted by e = (p, g1, g2,G1,G2,GT , eˆ(·, ·), φ(·)) and
two collision resistant Hash functions (CRHF) H :
{0, 1}∗ → Zp and H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → G2. The former
maps user’s global identity GID to an element in Zp
(denoted by u, i.e. H(GID) = u) and the latter maps
the message to be signed to an element in G2. Select
an admissible G2∈RG2 among the authorities. Next, for
each attribute authority k ∈ {1, · · · , N}, redefine the
attributes in universe {Uk}k∈{1,··· ,N} as elements in Zp,
and define a dk-element default attribute set Ck. Choose
a CRHF Hk : {0, 1}∗ → G2, which maps each attribute
i to the element in G2. Select xk, vk∈RZp and compute
yk = G
xk
2 , Yk = g
vk
1 , Zk = eˆ(Yk, G2).
Next the authorities pairwise engage a two party key
exchange protocol such that authority k and j share a
unique seed skj ∈ Zp, which is only known to them two
but not to any other authority i /∈ {k, j}. Specially, define
skj = sjk. Then the pseudorandom function between
authority k and j for user u is defined as
PRFkj(u) = G
xkxj/(skj+u)
2 , u ∈ Zp (4)
Finally, the public parameter
PP = ({yk, Yk, Zk, Hk, dk}k∈{1,··· ,N}, H,H ′, e,G2),
and the master secret key
MSK = ({xk, vk, {skj}j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}}k∈{1,··· ,N}).
• AKeyGen(PP,MSK,Au): To generate the key on at-
tribute set Au =
⋃
k∈{1,··· ,N}Ak,u, user u interacts with
authority k that works as follows.
1) For j ∈ {1, · · · , N}\{k}, let
g = yxkj , h = G2, α = δkjRkj , β = skj , γ = δkj ,
where Rkj is selected randomly from Zp by k,
δkj = 1 if k > j and δkj = −1 otherwise. Then
N − 1 times of anonymous key issuing protocols
between u and k are executed independently. As a
consequence, u gets
Dkj = G
Rkj
2 PRFkj(u), k > j
Dkj = G
Rkj
2 /PRFkj(u), k < j
2) Authority k randomly selects a dk − 1 degree
polynomial pk(·) such that
pk(0) = vk −
∑
j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}
Rkj (5)
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and for each attribute i ∈ Ak,u ∪ Ck and each rk,i
randomly selected from Zp, k computes
dk,i0 = G
pk(i)
2 Hk(i)
rk,i , dk,i1 = g
rk,i
1 .
3) Authority k outputs the user’s outsourcing key
OKk = ({dk,i0, dk,i1}i∈Ak,u∪Ck),
and the user’s private key
SKk = ({Dkj}j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}).
Finally, the user’s outsourcing keys and private keys are
OK = {OKk}k∈{1,··· ,N}, SK = {SKk}k∈{1,··· ,N}
• Signout(OK,Au,Υn,C∗): For an outsourced signing
query from user u, with OK = {OKk}k∈{1,··· ,N},
Au =
⋃
k∈{1,··· ,N}Ak,u and predicate Υn,C∗(·), where
C∗ =
⋃
k∈{1,··· ,N} C
∗
k , n =
∑
k∈{1,··· ,N} nk, |C∗k | = mk
and nk could be 0, the SCS works as follows.
1) For each k ∈ {1, · · · , N}, select a random nk-
element attribute subset A′k ⊆ Ak,u ∩ C∗k , and a
(dk−nk)-element default attribute subset C ′k ⊆ Ck.
Define Sk = A′k ∪ C ′k, and then |Sk| = dk. The
explanation of these different kinds of attribute sets
managed by authority k is listed together in Table
III for better understanding.
TABLE III
EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENT SETS MANAGED BY AUTHORITY k
Uk the universe set
Ck the dk-element default set chosen by authority k
Ak,u attribute subset that belongs to user u
C∗k the mk-element candidate attribute set in the predicate
A′k A
′
k ⊆ Ak,u ∩ C∗k , |A′k| = nk
C′k C
′
k ⊆ Ck , |C′k| = dk − nk
Sk Sk = A
′
k ∪ C′k , |Sk| = dk
2) Select mk + dk − nk random values
sk,1, · · · , sk,mk+dk−nk from Zp, and compute
the following items
σ′0 =
∏
1≤k≤N
(
∏
i∈Sk
d
∆i,Sk (0)
k,i0
∏
i∈C∗k∪C′k
Hk(i)
sk,i)
σ′k,i =
{
d
∆i,Sk (0)
k,i1 g
sk,i
1 , i ∈ Sk
g
sk,i
1 , i ∈ C∗k\A′k
3) Compute the following terms in addition.
W1 = eˆ(g1, σ
′
0),W2 =
∏
1≤k≤N
[
∏
i∈C∗k∪C′k
Zkeˆ(σ
′
k,i, Hk(i))]
Finally, output the partial signature together with the
corresponding witness
σpart = (σ
′
0, {{σ′k,i}i∈C∗k∪C′k}k∈{1,··· ,N}),W = (W1,W2).
• Sign(SK,m, σpart,W,Υn,C∗): To generate the formal
signature after receiving σpart from SCS and owning
(SK,m,Υn,C∗), u works as follows.
1) Compute
Du =
∏
(k,j)∈{1,··· ,N}×{1,··· ,N}\{k}
Dk,j
2) Check if the following equation holds.
eˆ(g1, Du) ·W1 ?= W2 (6)
3) If the above equation holds, then select a random
value s from Zp and compute
σ0 = Du · σ′0 ·H ′(m‖Υn,C∗)s
σs = g
s
1, σk,i = σ
′
k,i
Finally, output the final signature as
σ = (σ0, σs, {{σk,i}i∈C∗k∪C′k}k∈{1,··· ,N})
• Verify(PP, σ,m,Υn,C∗): On input the signature σ,
the message m with predicate Υn,C∗ and let v =
H ′(m‖Υn,C∗), the verification is processed by checking
the following equation
eˆ(g1, σ0)
?
=
∏
1≤k≤N
[
∏
i∈C∗k∪C′k
Zkeˆ(σk,i, Hk(i))] · eˆ(σs, v)
(7)
Output 1 and accept the signature if the above equation
holds; otherwise 0 and reject the signature.
Remark: The verification of equation 6 is an extension
compared with the scheme in the conference version. Note
that by multiplying eˆ(g1, v) on each side of equation 6 we get
equation 7. Thus the correctness of this verification procedure
is guaranteed. Also, since W1,W2 are generated from the
partial signature and public parameter, thus they will not affect
the security of the protocol. In addition, the verification of
partial signature only requires one pairing operation and one
multiplication operation. So this does not affect the efficiency
of the whole scheme.
C. Security Analysis
We present analysis of correctness, unforgeability, attribute
privacy, efficiency respectively, and outsourcing security and
privacy.
1) Correctness: Correctness is shown in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. The proposed ODMA-ABS scheme is correct.
Proof. Let Du =
∏
(k,j)∈{1,··· ,N}×{1,··· ,N}\{k}Dk,j , Sk =
A′k ∪ c′k and v = H ′(m‖Υn,C∗). The correctness of our
proposed scheme is proved by the following equation.
eˆ(g1, σ0) = eˆ(g1, Du ·
∏
k
(
∏
i∈Sk
d
∆i,Sk
(0)
k,i0
∏
i∈C∗
k
∪C′
k
Hk(i)
sk,i)vs)
= eˆ(g1, g
∑
kvk
2
∏
k
(
∏
i∈Sk
Hk(i)
rk,i∆i,Sk
(0)
∏
i∈C∗
k
∪C′
k
Hk(i)
sk,i)vs)
= eˆ(g1, g
∑
k vk
2 ) ·
∏
k
(
∏
i∈C∗
k
∪C′
k
eˆ(σk,i, Hk(i))) · eˆ(g1, vs)
=
∏
1≤k≤N
[
∏
i∈C∗
k
∪C′
k
Zkeˆ(σk,i, Hk(i))] · eˆ(σs, v)
(8)
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2) Unforgeability: The ODMA-ABS protocol achieves un-
forgeability. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The proposed ODMA-ABS protocol is existential-
ly unforgeable under co-CDH assumption.
Proof. The intuition behind the reduction to co-CDH problem
is as follows: According to the unforgeability definition, given
a co-CDH tuple (ga1 , g
b
2), We expect to construct a simulator
that solves the co-CDH problem by utilizing an adversary who
is able to forge the ODMA-ABS as a subroutine. The simulator
needs to simulate the response of the attribute authority when
receiving a query from the adversary and after that gives
a co-CDH solution from the signature that the adversary
forges. Note that in the multi-authority setting, the adversary is
allowed to corrupt a number of attribute authorities. Here we
prove the case when N − 1 attribute authorities are corrupted.
Since the corrupted authorities are all set before setup stage,
the simulator only needs to simulate the honest authority to
answer the query of the adversary. The specific procedure is
presented below.
Let F be an adversary that has a non-negligible advantage
 in breaking the unforgeability of the proposed ODMA-ABS
protocol. And suppose that F makes at most qHk , qH′ , qP , qO
and qS times of queries to the hash functions Hk (of authority
k), H ′, the private key generation oracle, the outsourcing key
generation oracle and the signing oracle respectively. Given a
co-CDH tuple (ga1 , g
b
2, eˆ) and to compute g
ab
2 , the simulator S
executes the simulation as follows.
• Initial S receives a corrupted authorities set
{1, · · · , N}\{k} and a challenge predicate Υnk,C∗k .
Here the predicate is restricted for only authority k since
other authorities are corrupted and can generate the
corresponding signature for any predicate.
• Setup Let the default attribute set denoted by Ck for
authority k. S selects a dk − nk subset C ′k ⊆ Ck and
publishes G1 = ga1 , G2 = g
b
2 to F . k picks xk ∈R Zp
and interacts with other k − 1 authorities and shares the
secret seeds skj . Publish yk = Gxk2 to F .
• Query S initializes an integer j = 0, an empty table L
and an empty set U , F is allowed to issue queries as
follows.
– Hk-query. S maintains a list L1 to store the answers
to the hash oracle Hk. On receiving a query i, C first
checks the list L1 and returns the corresponding an-
swer if the same value has been queried. Otherwise,
S simulates as follows.
1) If i ∈ C∗k ∪ C ′k, it chooses a βk,i ∈ Zp and
answers Hk(i) = g
βk,i
2 .
2) If i /∈ C∗k ∪ C ′k,it chooses αk,i, βk,i ∈ Zp and
answers Hk(i) = G2αk,ig
βk,i
2
After returning Hk(i), S adds the tuple (i,Hk(i))
onto the list L1.
– H ′-query. S picks a value δ∈R{1, · · · , qH′} and
maintains a list L2 to store the answers to the hash
oracle H ′. On receiving the l-th query ml ‖ Υnl,C∗l
for 1 ≤ l ≤ q2 and 1 ≤ nl,k ≤ dk, where
nl =
∑
k/∈Kc nl,k, S first checks the list L2 and
returns the corresponding answer if the same value
has been queried. Otherwise, S simulates as follows.
1) If l = δ, it chooses a β′k,δ ∈ Zp and answers
H ′(ml ‖ Υnl,C∗l ) = g
β′k,δ
2 .
2) If l 6= δ,it chooses αk,l, βk,′l ∈ Zp and answers
H ′(ml ‖ Υnl,C∗l ) = G2α
′
k,lg
β′k,l
2
After returning H ′(ml ‖ Υnl,C∗l ), S adds the tuple
(ml ‖ Υnl,C∗l , H ′(ml ‖ Υnl,C∗l )) onto the list L2.
– Private key query. On receiving a secret key query of
identity u, S first sets U = U ∪ {u} and maintains
a list L3. Then it checks if (u, SK) exists in L.
If so, return SK. Otherwise, S performs the same
operation as that in ODMA-ABS protocol. This is
because the secret key set {xk} is not invalid. As a
consequence, F receives Dkj = GRkj2 PRFkj(u) for
k > j and Dkj = G
Rkj
2 /PRFkj(u) for k < j, where
Rkj is randomly selected from Zp by C. Finally, after
returning SK, S adds the tuple (u, SK) onto the list
L3.
– Outsourcing key query. On receiving an outsourcing
key query of attribute set Ak, S sets j = j + 1 and
maintains a list L4. Then S simulates as follows.
1) If |Ak ∩C∗k | < nk, S chooses three sets Γ,Γ′, S
such that Γ = (Ak ∩C∗k)∪C ′k, |Γ′| = dk − 1and
Γ ⊆ Γ′ ⊆ Ak ∪ C ′k, S = Γ′ ∪ {0}. Here we
assume |Ak| > nk. Then for i ∈ Γ′, S chooses
τk,i, rk, i ∈R Zp and simulates{
dk,i0 = φ(G1)
τk,iHk(i)
rk,i
dk,i1 = g
rk,i
1
For i ∈ (Ak ∪ Ck)\Γ′, let Rk =∑
j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}Rkj , rk,i = r
′
k,i − a∆i,S(0)αk,i
where r′k, i ∈R Zp and simulate
dk,i0 =φ(G1)
∑
j∈Γ′ τk,j∆j,S(i)−(Rk+
βk,i
αk,i
)∆0,S(i)·
G2
αk,ir
′
k,ig
βk,ir
′
k,i
2
dk,i1 =G1
−∆0,S(i)αk,i g
r′k,i
2
2) If |Ak ∩ C∗k | ≥ nk, C chooses a1 and a random
polynomial pk(·) with pk(0) = a1 and simulates
OKk for i ∈ Ak ∪ Ck as
(dk,i0, dk,i1) = (φ(G1)
pk(·)Hk(i)rk,i , g
rk,i
1 )
where rk,i ∈R Zp.
– Signing Query. On receiving a signing query on
(m,Υn′,C∗), S first simulates the outsourced signing
phase for corrupted authorities j ∈ {1, · · · , N}\{k}.
Since all keys corresponding to corrupted authorities
are well prepared, the simulation of σj,0 and σj,i
executes just the same as that in the outsourced
signing phase of ODMA-ABS protocol, where σj,0
represents the factors to construct σ′0 except the
part generated from authority k’s OK. To simulate
the part of k’s with query (m,Υn′,C∗), C checks
whether |Ak ∩ C∗k | < nk. If so, S executes the
above private key query and outsourcing key query
once again and generates a signature with other
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k − 1 part normally as that in the protocol. Other-
wise, i.e. |Ak ∩ C∗k | ≥ nk, if H ′(m ‖ Υn,C∗) = gβ
′
k,δ
2 ,
the simulation is aborted. Otherwise, assume that
H ′(m ‖ Υn,C∗) = G2α
′
k,lg
β′k,l
2 , then S selects a
n′k-element subset Cˆ
∗ ⊆ C∗k and a (dk − n′k)-
element subset C ′′k ⊆ Ck. Let sk,i = s′k,i − aα′k,l ,
Sk = Cˆ
∗ ∪ C ′′k and the signature is simulated as
follows:
σ0 =
∏
j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}
σj,0
∏
i∈Sk
[Hk(i)
rk,i∆i,S(0)]
∏
i∈C∗
k
∪C′′
k
[Hk(i)
sk,i ]G2
α′k,ls
′
k,lφ(G1)
−
β′k,l
α′
k,l g
β′k,ls
′
k,l
2
σk,i =
{
g
rk,i∆i,Sk
(0)+sk,i
1 , i ∈ Sk
g
sk,i
1 , i ∈ C∗k\Cˆ∗
σs = G
− 1
α′
k,l
1 g
s′
1
where s′, rk,i, sk,t ∈R Zp for i ∈ Cˆ∗∪C ′′k , t ∈ C∗∪
C ′′k and {σj,i}j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k} remain the same as that
in ODMA-ABS protocol. Finally, S returns simu-
lated signature (σ0, σs, {{σj,i}i∈C∗j ∪C′′j }j∈{1,··· ,N})
to F . Here we claim that σ0 is correctly simulated
based on the following equation
σ0 =
∏
j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}
σj,0
∏
i∈Sk
[Hk(i)
rk,i∆i,Sk
(0)]
∏
j∈C∗
k
∪C′′
k
[Hk(i)
sk,i ]G2
α′k,ls
′
k,lφ(G1)
−
β′k,l
α′
k,l g
β′k,ls
′
k,l
2
= φ(G1)
b ∏
j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}
σj,0
∏
i∈Sk
[Hk(i)
rk,i∆i,Sk
(0)]∏
i∈C∗
k
∪C′′
k
[Hk(i)
sk,i ]H ′(m ‖ Υn′,C∗)s
= φ(G1)
Rk
∏
j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}
σj,0
∏
i∈Sk
[d
∆i,Sk
(0)
k,i0 ]∏
i∈C∗
k
∪C′′
k
[Hk(i)
sk,i ]H ′(m ‖ Υn′,C∗)s
= Du
∏
1≤j≤N
[
∏
i∈Sj
d
∆i,Sj (0)
j,i0
∏
i∈C∗j ∪C′′j
Hj(i)
sj,i ]
H ′(m ‖ Υn′,C∗)s
(9)
• Forgery After performing the query phase, F outputs
a forged signature σ∗ on message m∗ with predicate
Υn,C∗ . If the associated default attribute set is not C ′k
or H ′(m ‖ Υn′,C∗) 6= gβ
′
k,δ
2 , S will abort. Otherwise the
forged signature passes the verification algorithm which
means,
eˆ(g1, σ
∗
0) =
∏
1≤j≤N
[
∏
i∈C∗j ∪C′j
Yj eˆ(σ
∗
j,i, Hj(i))]
eˆ(σ∗s , H
′(m∗ ‖ Υn′,C∗))
=
∏
1≤j≤N
[
∏
i∈C∗j ∪C′j
eˆ(σ∗j,i, Hj(i))]∏
1≤j≤N
Zj eˆ(σ
∗
s , H
′(m∗ ‖ Υn′,C∗))
=
∏
1≤j≤N
[
∏
i∈C∗j ∪C′j
eˆ(σ∗j,i, g
βj,i
2 )]
eˆ(G1, G2)
∏
j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}
Zj eˆ(σ
∗
s , g
β′k,δ
2 ))
(10)
Then S can compute gab2 as,
gab2 =
σ∗0∏
j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}G
vj
2
∏
i∈C∗k∪C′k(φ(σ
∗
k,i)
βk,i)φ(σs∗)β
′
k,δ
(11)
Assume that F breaks the unforgeability of the proposed
ODMA-ABS protocol in t time with probability . Then we
can build a simulator to solve the co-CDH problem in t′ time
with probability ′, where t′ ≈ (∑k qHk+qH′+N(N−1)qP+
2|AO|qO + 32
∑
k(|C∗k |+ dk − nk)qS)te and ′ = qH′(dk−nkdk−1 )
.
Here AO represents the average number of attributes in queried
set in outsourcing key query respectively. C∗k and nk represent
the average values of the predicate parameters in signing
query. 1qh′ and
1
(dk−nkdk−1 )
represent the probabilities of which
the cases “the associated default attribute set is C ′k and
H ′(m,Υn′k,C∗k ) = g
β′k,δ
2 ” happen respectively. What is more,
te represents the time to perform a single-based exponentiation
operation in G1 or G2, and we assume without loss of reason-
ability that one multi-based exponentiation which multiples up
to 2 single-based exponentiation takes roughly the same as a
single-based exponentiation [23].
3) Attribute privacy: The ODMA-ABS also achieves at-
tribute privacy.
Theorem 3. The proposed ODMA-ABS protocol is attribute
private.
Proof. The proof of the theorem is simple. In fact, the core of
our construction is that any of the values of dk attribute points
can reconstruct the polynomial by Lagrange interpolation. And
we simply take nk attributes from the user’s attribute set (also
belong to the predicate attribute set) and dk − nk attributes
from the default attribute set. Thus, it is obvious that for
attribute sets Au0 and Au1 that both satisfy the predicate, they
both catch such dk elements that together with some dk − nk
elements from the default attribute set can retrieve the value
of the polynomial at point 0 and furthermore generate a valid
signature. This indicates that the valid signature do not reveal
which attribute set it takes use of. Assume without loss of
generality that nk = mk, we present the formal proof below.
• Setup The challenger C chooses a security parameter λ
and runs setup algorithm in the ODMA-ABS scheme to
generate
PP = ({yk, Yk, Zk, Hk, dk}k∈{1,··· ,N}, H,H ′, eˆ, G2),
MSK = ({xk, vk, {skj}j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}}k∈{1,··· ,N}).
It then publishes theme to adversary F .
• Query F is provided with access to private key oracle,
outsourcing key oracle and signing oracle. Since the
master secret key is given to adversary. The simulation
of the oracle response is obvious. We omit it here.
• Challenge After querying phase, F outputs a tuple
(Au0, Au1,Υn,C∗ ,m), where Υn,C∗(Aui) = 1 for (i =
0, 1), i.e. C∗ ⊂ Aui for i = 0, 1. The tuple is then sent
to C. C randomly picks a bit b ∈ {0, 1} to determine
which attribute set is used to generate the signature.
After that C chooses a (dk−nk)-element default attribute
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subset C ′k ⊆ Ck for each k ∈ {1, · · · , N} and runs the
Signout and Sign algorithms accordingly. Consequently,
the challenging signature σ∗ is generated and sent to F .
• Guess F outputs a bit b′ as a guess to which attribute is
used to generate the challenging signature.
Note that in the Challenge phase, since C∗ ⊂ Aui for i =
0, 1, we have A′k ⊆ Ak,ui ∩ C∗k = C∗k for i = 0, 1.With
the assumption that nk = mk and the fact that |A′k| = nk,
we have A′k = C
∗
k . Thus after running the Signout and Sign
algorithms, the challenging signature σ∗ is of the following
form, by letting A′k = C
∗
k .
σ∗ = (σ0, σs, {{σk,i}i∈C∗k∪C′k}k∈{1,··· ,N}),
where
σ0 =
∏
1≤k≤N
Gvk2 (
∏
i∈C∗k∪C′k
Hk(i)
rk,i∆i,Sk (0)+sk,i)·H ′(m‖Υn,C∗)s,
(12)
and
σk,i = g
rk,i∆i,Sk (0)+sk,i
1 , for i ∈ C∗k ∪ C ′k, k ∈ {1, · · · , N}.
(13)
σs = g
s
1 remains the same as that in the ODMA-ABS scheme.
Based on the Lagrange interpolation function, it is easy
to see that the challenging signature σ∗ can be generated by
secret keys produced from either attribute set Au0 or Au1. In
another word, any signature generated by secret keys produced
from Au0 can also be generated by secret keys produced
from Au1. Thus given a valid signature and without extra
information, the adversary is not able to distinguish which
set of Aui (i ∈ {0, 1}) is used to generate it with a probability
better than 12 +negl(λ), which means the attribute privacy for
signer holds.
4) Efficiency: The ODMA-ABS protocol achieves the effi-
ciency requirement of an outsourcing computation scheme.
Theorem 4. The proposed ODMA-ABS protocol is efficient.
Proof. It is easy to see that without SCS, the extra compu-
tations that the signer needs to operate are the same as that
in the Signout and the computation that the sigher saves is
just the checking of equation 6. It is obvious that the extra
computations are far more expensive than the saved one. This
indicates that the efficiency is satisfied. More details of the
simulated experiment will be illustrated to show the efficiency
in section IV-D.
5) Outsourcing security and privacy: As an outsourcing
computation protocol, our ODMA-ABS also achieves the
property of outsourcing security. In an outosurcing protocol,
security implies that an untrusted worker (i.e. cloud server)
is unable to make the user accept an incorrect result that it
outputs with non-negligible probability. And for ODMA-ABS,
this means that an untrusted server, if not honestly executing
the Signout algorithm, is unable to output a partial signature
that passes the user’s verification (i.e. equation 6) with non-
negligible probability. To prove that outsourcing security holds
for ODMA-ABS, we notice that the verification of outsourcing
procedure (i.e. equation 6) is equivalent to the verification of
final signature (i.e. equation 7). So we would like to reduce
the outsourcing security to ODMA-ABS unforgeabilility. We
claim that an adversarial cloud server, who has the outsourcing
key that is related to singer’s attribute set Au, is not able to
forge a valid signature. Consider the following two cases.
(i) The cloud server would like to forge a signature for
some predicate Υ that satisfies Υ(Au) = 0. This is the
same scenario as that in the ungorgeability experiment,
with the difference that the adversary is unable to access
the private key oracle. According to Theorem 2, the
adversary cannot forge a valid signature, even if it is able
to access the private key oracle.
(ii) The cloud server would like to forge a signature for the
predicate Υˆ that satisfies Υˆ(Au) = 1. Notice that this
is no longer identical to the unforgeability experiment.
To prove the unforgeability in this situation, we consider
a multi-authority ABS protocol. In the new MA-ABS, a
central authority (indicated by authority 0) holds a secret
key SK that is identical to the SK in ODMA-ABS.
This SK is associated with the attribute that is unique
for each user. If we mark this attribute as iu then the
user’s attribute set will become A′u = Au ∪ iu. Also,
the central authority allocates different master secret keys
to each attribute authority k (k ∈ {1, · · · , N}). The
authority k uses its unique master key to generate attribute
private key that is identical to OKk in ODMA-ABS.
Other algorithms in MA-ABS remains the same as that
in ODMA-ABS. Such MA-ABS is equivalent to the one
proposed in [8]. If we consider the same adversarial
behavior in this MA-ABS, it will be forging a valid
signature for the predicate Υˆ that satisfies Υˆ(Au) = 0.
With a similar method in [8] and the unforgeability proof
of ODMA-ABS, it is easy to prove the unforgeability of
the corresponding MA-ABS protocol.
Above all, the security of the outsourcing procedure is proved.
As to privacy, the cloud server gets the outsourcing keys of
the user. However, these outsourcing keys include nothing that
is relative to the user’s identity u. u is embedded in SK that
is kept secret by the user. So the privacy of the user’s identity
is preserved.
D. Performance
To evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme,
we present theoretical analysis of storage complexity and
experimental simulation of computation and communication
overhead.
1) Theoretical analysis of storage complexity: For the
signer, the storage overhead involves private keys SK and
outsourcing keys OK that are returned by attribute author-
ities, partial signature σpart that is returned by the signing
cloud server, and the final signature σ. To be specific, let
|G| represent the length of the element in the group used
in ODMA-ABS protocol, i.e. |G| = poly(λ). We show a
comparison between ODMA-ABS and chen et al.’s OABS
[23] with respect to key size and signature size in Table IV.
In the table, ik,u = |Ak,u|, dk, nk,mk refer to the same as
that in the ODMA-ABS protocol, and iu, d, n,m refer to the
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Fig. 2. Efficiency Comparison for Setup, KeyGen, Signing and Verify among OABS, ODMA-ABS and DMA-ABS
TABLE IV
COMPARISON WITH RESPECT TO KEY SIZE AND SIGNATURE SIZE
ODMA-ABS OABS[23]
SK size |G| 2|G|
OK size 2∑Nk=1(ik,u + dk)|G| 2(iu + d− 1)|G|
σpart size (1 +
∑N
k=1(mk + dk − nk)N)|G| (1 +m+ d− n)|G|
σ size (2 +∑Nk=1(mk + dk − nk)N)|G| (3 +m+ d− n)|G|
corresponding ik,u, dk, nk,mk in our multi-authority setting.
From the table, it is easy to tell that the storage complexities
of ODMA-ABS and OABS are both O(poly(λ)). Also, for
the attributes of the same signer, we have iu =
∑N
k=1 ik,u.
In practice, it is acceptable to have the values of nk and
mk satisfying n =
∑N
k=1 nk and m =
∑N
k=1mk. So if we
set proper values for dk, we can get an ODMA-ABS that is
comparable with OABS [23] in storage overhead.
2) Experimental Results for ODMA-ABS: In this part, we
analyze the results of the experimental simulations for each
algorithm in the proposed ODMA-ABS scheme. Notice that
there are three entities involved in the experiment, the attribute
authorities, the signer, and the signing cloud server. The
attribute authorities are simulated on a Linux machine with
Intel (R) Core (TM) i7-6550U CPU processor running at 2.50
GHz and 4 GB RAM; The signer is simulated on a virtual
machine with Intel (R) Core (TM) i7-8550U CPU processor
TABLE V
CLOUD CONFIGURATION
physical id : 0
cpu cores : 14
processor : 8
cpu model : Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6132 CPU @ 2.60GHz
memory : 8 GB
running at 1.80 GHz and 512 MB RAM; And the signing cloud
server (SCS) is deployed in the public cloud provided by our
institution with the following configuration shown in Table V.
The bandwidth between user and cloud server is 200 Mbps.
The Verify algorithm is simulated on a Linux machine with
Intel (R) Core (TM) i7-6550U CPU processor running at 2.50
GHz and 4 GB RAM. When implementing each algorithm
in the proposed protocol, C programming language with the
Pairing Based Cryptography Library-0.5.14 (PBC Library-
0.5.14) is used.
In the experiment, We implement three schemes, the OABS
[23], the original DMA-ABS and the proposed ODMA-ABS.
The original DMA-ABS is constructed simply in the following
ways. (i) The Setup, KeyGen and Verify algorithms remain
unchanged compared with ODMA-ABS. The same Signout
algorithm is performed by the signer instead of being out-
sourced to the SCS. (ii) The computation of terms W1,W2 and
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the verification of outsourcing results are no longer needed
by either the SCS or the user. By comparing the original
DMA-ABS with ODMA-ABS, we show a computation over-
head reduction by means of outsourcing technology. And by
comparing OABS [23] with ODMA-ABS, we show that the
computation and communication overhead of the two schemes
are comparable, while ODMA-ABS achieves better properties
in security and privacy preservation. Now we give more details
about the experiments of each algorithm. We fix the number of
attribute authorities in DMA-ABS and ODMA-ABS N = 3.
The Setup algorithms are performed by the attribute au-
thority(ies). In OABS [23], there is only one authority and
we just need to simulate the deployment in this authority.
When it comes to DMA-ABS and ODMA-ABS, there are
multiple authorities. And each authority not only executes its
own operation but also interacts with other ones. We claim
that the internal operation of each authority can be executed
in parallel. In the Setup phases of all the three schemes, the
variables that affect the time cost are d (dk) and |U| (|Uk|), i.e.
the orders of the default attribute set and the attribute universe
respectively. It is reasonable to have |U| =∑k |Uk| because
multiple authorities just classify and manage different kinds
of attributes, while not making the whole attributes universe
increase. But it is improper to have d =
∑
k dk because the
value of dk is also associated with the security of the protocol
and should not be much smallers than d. In this experiment, we
let dk=d. This may result in a little more storage burden for
ODMA-ABS compared with OABS [23]. We present a time
cost comparison of Setup algorithms among three schemes
in Fig 2(a) by choosing dk = 10, 20 respectively, and |Uk|
varying from 20 to 60. The result shows that even when
we set d = dk, which makes
∑
k dk > d, our ODMA-
ABS still achieves a better performance than OABS. This is
because in ODMA-ABS the deployment procedures inside all
authorities are executed in parallel, and the interactions among
authorities are much less time-consuming than the deployment
procedures. Fig 2(a) also shows that the time costs of DMA-
ABS and ODMA-ABS are almost the same. This is because
the two Setup algorithms in DMA-ABS and ODMA-ABS
remain the same.
In the KeyGen phase, the variables that affect the time cost
become d (dk) and |Au| (|Ak,u|). In the experiment, we also
choose dk = d = 10, 20 respectively, and |Ak,u| varying from
8 to 20. Notice that |Au| =
∑
k |Ak,u| since the user’s attribute
set remains identical in different schemes. The result of time
cost is shown in Fig 2(b). From the figure we can see that
our ODMA-ABS achieves a better performance than OABS
in KeyGen time. This is because in ODMA-ABS the attribute
authorities can generate user’s attribute in parallel. Also, the
KeyGen algorithms in DMA-ABS and ODMA-ABS are still
idnetical, which results in little difference of time cost between
ODMA-ABS and DMA-ABS.
In the Signing phase, the user needs to interact with the
signing cloud server (SCS). The total time cost in the whole
procedure involves communication part and computation part.
The variables that affect the communication cost are d (dk)
and |Au| (|Ak,u|) as is shown in Table IV. And the variables
that affect the computation cost become n (nk) and m (mk),
i.e. the threshold values and the orders of the attribute set in
the predicate. In this experiment, we assume that the certain
user has obtained the keys from the attribute authority(ies)
and would like to generate a signature with respect to the
predicate Υn,C∗ , where |C∗| = m and n =
∑N
k=1 nk,
m =
∑N
k=1mk. Under such circumstances the values of d
(dk) and |Au| (|Ak,u|) are fixed and the values of n (nk)
and m (mk) are changeable. The simulation of the algorithms
in three different schemes are conducted in several cases for
d = dk = 10, |Ak,u| = 10, nk = 5, 10, mk = 20, 30, 40
respectively. The result is shown in Fig 2(c), where “com.”
is short for “communication”. Comparing the performance
of ODMA-ABS with DMA-ABS, it is obvious to see that
the total time cost to generate the signature is reduced by
utilizing outsourcing technique, and the reduction is much
more remarkable with respect to the user’s overhead. This is
consistent with our analysis in section IV-C4. Comparing the
performance of ODMA-ABS with OABS, we can see that the
performance on the signer side in ODMA-ABS is better than
that in OABS. This is because in ODMA-ABS the signer just
needs to multiply the secret key by σpart, while the signer in
OABS has to deal with another private key pair associated with
the default attribute, which is much more time-consuming.
However, due to the fact that d<
∑
k dk, the communication
and SCS’s computation cost in ODMA-ABS are more than that
in OABS. Actually, when we choose a smaller value for dk to
have d=
∑
k dk, the performance of communication and SCS’s
computation cost in both schemes can become comparable,
while the advantage of ODMA-ABS in signer’s overhead still
maintains. We consider it as a trade-off between efficiency and
security.
Finally, in the Verify phase, the variables that affect the
time cost are d (dk),n (nk) and m (mk). More specifically,
by observing equation 7 we can deduce that the time cost of
Verify algorithm is proportional to the value m+d−n (mk+
dk−nk). Similar with the assumption in the Signing phase, we
fix dk=d=10 and varying the values of nk and mk with nk =
5, 10, mk from 20 to 60. The result is shown in Fig 2(d). We
can see that the performance of ODMA-ABS and DMA-ABS
are almost identical since the two Verify algorithms in both
schemes remain the same. And the performance of OABS is
better than the two decentralizing schemes. This is still because
of the values we choose for d and dk.
V. AN ACCESS CONTROL SCHEME BASED ON
ODMA-ABS
In this section, we discuss the applications of ODMA-ABS
that can be used in the IoT scenario. As introduced in previous
section, (multi-authority) attribute based signature can provide
anonymous certification of data and access control for IoT
devices. To realize access control for IoT devices, we design an
attribute based access control (ABAC) scheme that is derived
from the idea of the proposed ODMA-ABS.
A. Construction of the Attribute Based Access Control scheme
There are usually three kinds of entities in the attribute
based access control system: the server that stores resource,
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the user who would like to access certain resource in the
server and the attribute authorities that issue private keys for
the user. We will design the ABAC scheme in decentralized
multi-authority setting. In ABAC, the user can request attribute
private keys from each attribute authority. Then the user gener-
ates corresponding proofs to show that his/her attributes satisfy
certain predicate and sends them to the server for verification.
One concern in this process is that the user may share some of
his/her attribute private keys with others to let them be able to
have the same access to certain resource. To address this, we
introduce a unique secret key that is related to the user. The
user needs to generate a proof of this secret key together with
his/her attributes to prove his/her legitimate identity. This proof
generation is easy to conduct in the asymmetric bilinear group.
In addition, the user’s computational overhead to generate the
proof of the legitimate identity can be further reduced by
outsourcing. Since the outsourcing technique is similar with
that in the ODMA-ABS, it will be omitted in the following
construction. Our ABAC scheme involves three phases that
work as follows.
• Setup: On input the security parameter λ, and a common
reference string (CRS), the N attribute authorities gener-
ate an admissible asymmetric bilinear group denoted by
e = (p, g1, g2,G1,G2,GT , eˆ(·, ·), φ(·)) and two collision
resistant Hash functions (CRHF) H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp,
H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → G2. The hash functions are similar
with that in the ODMA-ABS scheme. Select an admissi-
ble G2∈RG2 among the authorities. For each attribute
authority k ∈ {1, · · · , N}, redefine the attributes in
universe {Uk}k∈{1,··· ,N} as elements in Zp, and define
a dk-element default attribute set Ck. Choose a CRHF
Hk : {0, 1}∗ → G2 that maps each attribute i to the
element in G2. Select xk, vk∈RZp and compute yk =
Gxk2 , Yk = g
vk
1 , Zk = eˆ(Yk, G2). Next the authorities
pairwise engage a two party key exchange protocol as
that in ODMA-ABS and consequently authority k and j
share a unique seed skj ∈ Zp that satisfies skj = sjk.
Finally, output the public parameter and the master secret
key as
PP = ({yk, Yk, Zk, Hk, dk}k∈{1,··· ,N}, H,H ′, e,G2),
MSK = ({xk, vk, {skj}j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}}k∈{1,··· ,N}).
• User Grant: Assume that the user u has the public key
pku = G
s
2 where s is the secret key and his attribute set
Au =
⋃
k∈{1,··· ,N}Ak,u, user u interacts with authority
k that works as follows.
1) For j ∈ {1, · · · , N}\{k}, run the AKI protocol
between j and u as that in ODMA-ABS. As a
consequence, u gets
Dkj = G
Rkj
2 PRFkj(u), k > j
Dkj = G
Rkj
2 /PRFkj(u), k < j
2) k randomly selects a dk−1 degree polynomial pk(·)
such that
pk(0) = vk −
∑
j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}
Rkj (14)
and for each i ∈ Ak,u ∪Ck and each rk,i randomly
selected from Zp, computes
dk,i0 = G
pk(i)
2 (pkuHk(i))
rk,i , dk,i1 = g
rk,i
1 .
3) k outputs the private key tuple SKK =
({dk,i0, dk,i1}i∈Ak,u∪Ck , {Dkj}j∈{1,··· ,N}\{k}).
Finally, output the user’s private keys as
SK = {SKk}k∈{1,··· ,N}.
• File Access: Suppose that the user has obtained the
private keys and would like to access some resource with
the policy that is defined by predicate Υn,C∗(·) (similar
with that in ODMA-ABS scheme), the user takes the
following steps.
1) For each k ∈ {1, · · · , N}, select a random nk-
element attribute subset A′k ⊆ Ak,u ∩ C∗k , and a
(dk−nk)-element default attribute subset C ′k ⊆ Ck.
Define Sk = A′k ∪ C ′k, and then |Sk| = dk.
2) Select mk + d − nk random values
sk,1, · · · , sk,mk+d−nk from Zp, and compute
the following items
σ′0 =
∏
1≤k≤N
(
∏
i∈Sk
d
∆i,Sk (0)
k,i0
∏
i∈C∗k∪C′k
(pkuHk(i))
sk,i)
σ′k,i =
{
d
∆i,Sk (0)
k,i1 g
sk,i
1 , i ∈ Sk
g
sk,i
1 , i ∈ C∗k\A′k
3) Compute
Du =
∏
(k,j)∈{1,··· ,N}×{1,··· ,N}\{k}
Dk,j ,
and then compute
σ0 = Du · σ′0, σk,i = σ′sk,i.
4) The user then sends the tuple (σ0, σ′k,i, σk,i). The
server checks if the following equation holds.
eˆ(g1, σ0)
?
=
∏
1≤k≤N
[
∏
i∈C∗
k
∪C′
k
Zkeˆ(σ
′
k,i, Hk(i))eˆ(σk,i, G2)]
(15)
If the above equation holds, then the user will
be allowed to access the resource that is stored in
the server. Otherwise, the access request will be
rejected.
B. attribute key update
In this part, we discuss the update of attribute private keys.
In practical scenario, the attribute set of a user may not be
constant all the time. Sometimes, certain attribute of the user
will be revoked from the user’s attribute set or there will be
some new attributes inserted in the user’s attribute set. It is
required that the attribute private keys are effectively updated
when the attribute set of the user is changed. Here “effectively”
means that the update shall only happen to the keys that are
associated with the inserted/revoked attributes. In this paper,
we just briefly introduce how to realize effective update for
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attribute private keys, but leave the technical details in the
future work. To do so, we let each attribute authority build
a set of all users who owns certain attribute and allocate a
unique attribute group key for the set. The group key and the
set are shared with the resource storage server. The storage
server then choose a key encoding key (KEK) to encode
the group key. When a user propose an access request to
the storage server, it returns the encoded group key to the
user. The user can obtain the KEK by his current attribute set
and then get the group key. And the authentication tuple that
the user generates is required to contain the correct attribute
group key. When certain attribute is changed, the attribute
authority not only generates a new private key for user but
also change the corresponding attribute group key and the
user set for the storage server. The server also updates the
corresponding KEK. When a request is proposed by the user,
the updated group key and KEK will be sent to him/her. And
the outdated attribute private keys can no longer be used since
it cannot generate the correct authentication tuple with either
updated group key or outdated group key. We will present
detailed algorithms for attribute key update in the future work.
Moreover, to make the access control scheme more robust,
we also consider two-factor authentication. There are some
good techniques that can be utilized to realize two-factor
authentication [30], [31]. We will discuss more in the future
work.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented an outsourced decentralized multi-
authority attribute based signature scheme. The ODMA-ABS
achieves attribute privacy and is able to detect malicious be-
haviors of the signing cloud server. Furthermore, by outsourc-
ing heavy computation overhead to a signing cloud server,
the scheme also achieves strong performance in efficiency.
We have proved the security properties and compared certain
schemes to show the advantages of our scheme. An access
control scheme based on the proposed ODMA-ABS is also
presented as a specific application of ODMA-ABS.
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